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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

TBE 10(j) LABOR INJUNCTION: AN EXERCISE
IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act authorizes the
National Labor Relations Board in certain unfair labor practice cases
to seek in a federal district court "appropriate temporary relief or restraining order," and empowers the court "to grant to the Board such
temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper."'
Although this section has been the law since 1947, only recently has it
been used enough to merit serious consideration in most unfair labor
practice litigation. The standards which guide issuance of injunctions
under section 10(j) have never been clear, and the Board's policy of
increased use of that section since 19612 has highlighted difficulties in
its administration. McLeod v. General Electric Co., 257 F. Supp. 690
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.), temp. stay pend. cert., 87
Sup. Ct. 5 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 1966), cert. granted on principal
issue but remanded on other grounds, 385 U.S. 533 (1967), articulated
a principle implicit in most of the cases construing this section. Because this principle may be authoritatively sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in the near future, 3 it is worthwhile to examine its validity.
General Electric Co. refused to bargain with an IUE negotiating
team including members of seven other unions representing G.E. employees. Regional Director McLeod, acting for General Counsel of
the Board, issued a complaint charging G.E. with refusal to bargain in
2Labor

Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101(10) (1), 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(j) (1964). The section in its entirety reads:

The board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair
labor practice, to petition any United States district court within any district
wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief
or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction
to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just
and proper.
'As of June 30, 1965, the Board had made a total of 112 petitions for injunctions
under section 10(j). Of this number, 46 were sought prior to June 30, 1961, and 66
were sought since that date. That is an average of 3 per year prior to 1961, and 16
per year since then. Extracted from NLRB ArNx. REPs., (1948-1965). Tables are
reproduced in the appendices (table 18) since 1952, and in the text of discussion on
section 10(j) prior to that date.
'Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. If the language of the Supreme
Court's opinion interpreting the holding of the district court is any index, the
Court failed to see the crucial issue of whether Section 10(j) requires judicial
deference. If there was such a misinterpretation it is possibly because the Court
did not consider fully the merits at this time but simply remanded for further
consideration of the mootness issue.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL.42:1107

violation of section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.4
Pursuant to section 10(j) of the Act, the Regional Director sought to
enjoin G.E.'s refusal to bargain. In a federal district court it was held:
injunction granted. Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act
permitting the NLRB to seek "appropriate relief," and empowering the
courts to grant such relief as is "just and proper," requires judicial
deference to the Board's judgment in deciding when such relief will
issue.
The district court, in the principal case, saw the problem as involving
two questions: when should the Board seek an injunction, and when,
if one is sought, should it be granted.' Rejecting G.E.'s attempt to
hold the Board to public statements stating that the injunction would
be limited to flagrant violations, the court pointed out that the Board
cannot be legally bound by public statements of its members.' The
court argued that Congress entrusted the Board with "essential judgment" as to when the public interest required an injunction,7 and left
to the courts power to deny relief only in "routine cases" where there
is "no good reason to short-circuit the normal processes of administrative hearing and judicial review."' Particular implementations of the
10(j) injunction were left "mainly for the Board's administrative
judgment."9 Given a proper exercise of discretion, the court would
deny relief only if there was no reasonable cause to believe the charged
party had committed an unfair labor practice."0
The Second Circuit, in reversing the district court, emphasized the
extraordinary nature of the remedy," and concluded that the Board
had "not demonstrated that an injunction is necessary to preserve the
status quo or to prevent any irreparable harm."' 2 Although it emphasized the importance of G.E. to national defense," the court indicated its preference that the usual avenues of Board adjudication
and judicial review be exercised with dispatch.' 4 The circuit court
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101(8) (a) (5), 29 U.S.C.

§158(a) (5) (1964).
'257 F. Supp. at 707.

'Id. at 702, 708 and n.14.
7Id. at 708.
8Id.
OId. at 709 n.15.
" Id. at 709. Judge Frankel indicated that "the points of controversy are essentially legal rather than factual," and that were it a matter of independent judgment,
the decision would have gone for the Board. Id. at 710.

366 F.2d at 849.
Id. at 850.

Id.

24Id.
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assumed that primary discretion over issuance of injunctions was in
the hands of the Board, " and reversed largely on the ground that by
its action in seeking an injunction, the Board deprived the courts of
the benefit of its expertise on the underlying unfair labor practice
which would have been available had normal procedures been used. 6
Mr. Justice Harlan, acting as circuit justice, entered a temporary
stay of the circuit court's decision pending application for certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of standards, but
remanded the case to determine the effect of a subsequent contract
7
between the parties on the mootness of that issue.'
Under the normal procedures in injunction cases, the Regional Director first issues a complaint and notice of hearing on the underlying
unfair labor practice. Then, the regional office conducts an independent investigation and on the basis of that investigation the Regional
Director determines whether injunctive relief is required. If such
relief is deemed necessary, petition is filed in a district court requesting
an injunction under the Act. It is in answer to an order to show cause
in the district court that the respondent has his first opportunity to
challenge the propriety of such relief.
This note presents an alternative to the district court's interpretation
in the principal case requiring deference to the judgment of the administrator. This alternative is desirable because on the one hand,
there is no compelling reason to adopt the district court's position, and
on the other, desirable policy dictates another result. The material is
discussed under four subject-headings: (a) the language of section
10(j) is vague; (b) prior judicial interpretations of this language have
not resolved its ambiguity; (c) the context and legislative history of
section 10(j) are not conclusive on the issue of deference; and (d)
fairness dictates that the current interpretation be changed.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 10(j) IS VAGUE
The text of section 10(j) suffers from lack of clarity in two important respects. First, it does not indicate whether issuance of injunctions is to be a matter for the discretion of the Board, with the court
deferring to administrative judgment, or whether the court is to define
its own set of independent standards within which the Board is to be
required to act. Second, it provides little guidance in determining what
those standards will be.
Is Id. at 849-50.

'1Id.at 850.

"7385 U.S. at 535.
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The language of section 10(j) empowers the Board, upon issuance
of an unfair labor practice complaint, to petition a federal district court
for "appropriate temporary relief or restraining order." The court is
given jurisdiction to "grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper." The phrase "temporary
relief or restraining order" is modified twice in this section; once in
reference to the Board's power to seek, and once in reference to the
court's power to grant. In either instance the modifying term ("appropriate" or "just and proper") may be taken as descriptive of the nature
of the "relief or order" to be sought or granted, or it may be taken as
descriptive of the nature of the "case" or "fact situation" in which such
relief is to be sought or granted.
Further ambiguity is present in the use of the pronoun "it" in the
clause granting the courts jurisdiction to "grant to the Board such
temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper."
(Emphasis added). If the "it" refers to the Board, there is no discretion granted to the court. If the "it" refers to the court, there is at least
discretion sufficient to decide in which cases relief would be "just and
proper."
As a result of these difficulties, the language of the section is inconclusive in regard to the allocation of responsibility between court and
Board. In any event the Board preliminarily decides whether the public interest demands an action for such injunction. Given the decision
to seek an injunction, the question is whether the court must therefore
presume that an injunction is needed, defer to administrative judgment, and place a burden on the respondent to show that the injunction is not necessary. According to the courts' interpretation of this
section, the Board exercises primary decision-making power over issuance of injunctions. As a practical matter, issuance is nearly certain
once the Board has made its decision to petition. According to the
interpretation urged by this note, the court would define its own standards within which the Board must operate.
PRIoR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION
10(j) HAS NOT RESOLVED ITS AMBIGUITY
As a result of this lack of clarity in the language, the standards for
issuance of 10(j) injunctions have been difficult to settle. The few
times courts have been faced with the question,' 8 the tendency has
II.

'SUp to June 30, 1965, the 10(j) injunction had only been litigated in the courts
71 times. NLRB Awx. REPs., supra note 2. Information not found in the tables was
extracted from the text.
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been to assume that the Board knows what it is doing, and to grant the
injunction without careful investigation into the facts. A comparison
with section 10(l) suggests little more by direct inference than that the
injunction under 10(j) was not thought to be needed in every case. 9
Statements in the legislative history (which is far from extensive) indicate that the section was included to prevent irreparable harm and
to protect the public interest,2 0 but the meaning of these abstractions
can only be supplied by careful discussion of fact situations in light
of the relevant issue. Such discussion is hard to find. As a result of
these difficulties, the injunction, when sought, has almost always been
granted.2
Many of the courts granting injunctions have never confronted the
issue of need for relief. Some courts have apparently assumed that
given reasonable cause to believe a violation has been committed the
issue is not open to judicial question. 2 Others have explicitly stated
that the court must defer to administrative judgment.23 Most of the
cases which pass beyond the previous two situations nevertheless mechanically apply the statute to the facts.24 In many of the cases in which
the issue of proper standards has been raised, and discussed, the need
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101(10) (1), 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(1) (1964), provides that in every case in which a complaint is issued under

section 8(b) (4) (secondary boycotts) the Board must seek a temporary injunction
in a federal court and the court may grant such injunction as it deems "just and
proper." Because no discretion is vested in the Board under section 10(l) it has
been held that issuance of these injunctions is wholly for the courts to decide. Retail
Clerks Union v. Food Employer's Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1965).
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 27 (1947). See LeBus v. Manning, Maxwell
& Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. La. 1963).
'Of the 71 times the courts had passed on the 10(j) question as of June 30, 1965,
injunctions were granted 59 times, and denied 12 times. NLRB ANN. REPs. supra
note 2. Information not found in the tables was extracted from the text.
'McLeod v. Compressed Air Workers, 194 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd,
292 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1961) (both opinions) ; Douds v. I.L.A., 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1957) ; Brown v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 218 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1955) (concurring opinion
of Pope, J.); Elliot v. Dubois Chemicals, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Tex. 1962);
Kennedy v. Telecomputing Corp., 49 L.R.R.M. 2188 (S.D. Cal 1961); Johnston v.
Wellington Mfg. Div., 49 L.R.R.M. 2536 (W.D.S.C. 1961); Hull v. Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 161 F. Sup. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); LeBus v.
Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. La. 1963); Fusco v.
Richard W. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
"'Reynolds v. Herron Yarn Mills, Inc., 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 17,147, 11,347 (W.D.
Tenn. 1966) ; Potter v. United Foods, Inc., 58 L.R.R.M. 2469 (S.D. Tex. 1965) ; Alpert
v. Trailways of New England, 58 L.R.R.M. 2152 (D.C. Mass. 1965); Rains v. East
Tenn. Pkg. Co., 240 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Brooks v. Square Tube Corp.,
56 L.R.R.M. 2881 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Davis v. Ferrantello, 56 L.R.RM. 2316 (N.D.
Tex. 1964); Johnston v. Evans, 223 F. Supp. 766 (E.D.N.C. 1963); Madden v. Alberto
Culver Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 2516 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Elliott v. Sheet Metal Workers, 42
L.R.R.M. 2100 (D.C.N.M. 1958); Schnied v. District 50 U.M.W., 40 L.R.R.M. 2529
(N.D. Ill. 1957); Douds v. I.L.A., 33 L.R.R.M. 2004 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Madden v.
Cargill, Inc., 30 L.R.R.M. 2459 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
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for an injunction was so clear by any standard that no incisive analysis
was needed for the holding; and the cases are easily restricted to their
facts.2 5
In the few cases in which the requested injunction has been denied,
the grounds for denial were almost always that the Board failed to
show reasonable cause to believe a violation had been committed.2
The question of standards was never approached. In the very few
instances in which an injunction has been denied for lack of need for
that injunction, the court has failed to handle the problem in a clear
and helpful fashion.2"
This is not to suggest that the judicial history of section 10(j) is
devoid of any well-considered discussion of the problem. It is only
to demonstrate that such discussion has not carried the day.

III.

THE CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

10(j) ARE INCONCLUSIVE ON THE ISSUE OF DEFERENCE

The language of section 10(j) is not conclusive as to whether the
courts are required to defer to administrative judgment on standards
for issuance. There are, however, inferences which may be drawn from
'Henderson v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,360,

11,081 (D.C.N.M.

1966); LeBus v. Local 1800 I.L.A., 52 L.R.R.M. 2500 (E.D. La. 1963); Compton v.

Sea-Land Serv., Inc. 53 L.R.R.M. 2016 (D.C.P.R. 1963); Potter v. Cement Workers
Union, 48 L.R.RtM. 2965 (E.D. Tex. 1961); Madden v. Alberto Culver Co., 49
L.R.R.M. 2516 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Douds v. I.L.A., 147 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
aff'd 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957); Douds v. American Coal Shipping, Inc., 39 L.R.R.M.
2767 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Brown v. National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards, 104 F.
Supp. 685 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Jaffee v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverer's Union, 97 F.
Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935
(D.D.C. 1950); Curry v. Union De Trabajadores De La Industria Del Cemento Ponce,
86 F. Supp. 707 (D.C.P.R. 1949); Madden v. United Mine Workers, 79 F. Supp. 616
(D.D.C. 1948).
- Johnston v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 234 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.C. 1964), affd. 341 F.2d
891 (4th Cir. 1965); Getreu v. Armco Steel Corp., 241 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. Ohio 1964);
Davis v. Ferrantello, 56 L.R.R.M. 2316 (N.D. Tex. 1964); Penello v. Burlington
Industries, 54 L.R.R.M. 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963); Phillips v. Burlington Industries,
49 L.R.R.M. 2144 (N.D. Ga. 1961); Graham v. Boeing Airplane Co., 22 L.R.R.M.
2243 (W.D. Wash. 1948).
' McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted 385 U.S.
533 (1967); Johnston v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 341 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1965); Penello
v. Burlington Indus., 54 L.R.R.M. 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963).
2 In Henderson v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,360, 16,361, 1 11,081
(D.C.N.M. 1966), the court said:
An injunction should not be granted just because petitioner requests it. The court
should exercise its sound discretion in granting the temporary injunction or in
denying such an injunction, and such is to be determined by the court. It is not
whether or not the Board has reasonable grounds to believe that an injunction
should issue but whether or not the Court has reasonable grounds that it should
issue.
It appears that Henderson is an exception among the recent cases. Some earlier
opinions, however, concur in this approach: Brown v. National Union of Marine
Cooks & Stewards, 104 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Douds v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
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the statute's context and legislative history which suggest that no
deference was intended.
It has been argued that one of the chief reasons for placing power
over labor matters in the hands of the National Labor Relations Board
in 1935 was to effect an institutional change and thereby reduce the
influence of federal courts whose anti-labor tendencies had long been
known.2" It was feared that the NLRA would be destroyed as an
effective weapon of social reform if it were given to the courts to apply.
By 1947, Congressional attitudes had significantly changed and the
power of unions had grown far out of proportion to what it was in the
early 1930's."° It would not have been inconsistent with the purposes
of a statute so obviously designed to curtail union power as was the
Taft-Hartley Act that it should have vested certain limited discretion
over labor matters in the federal courts.
Furthermore, other sections of the Act provide for judicial remedies
not previously included in the labor law. Section 303 (b) provides
that unions may be sued in federal courts for damages occasioned by
certain unfair labor practices defined in section 8(b) (4) of the Act."'
Section 208(a) gives the courts power, upon petition by the Attorney
General in national emergency disputes, to issue an injunction." Section 10(1) vests power in the courts to enjoin certain unfair labor
practices where they deem it just and proper."3 In none of these instances is there any question about deference to an administrator.
Again, it is not inconsistent to conclude that Congress intended to vest
similar power in courts under section 10 (j).31
There is no reason to conclude that the courts must defer under
10(j) from comparison with section 10(l). Althtough it is true that
section 10(j) does not require Board initiation, while 10(l) does, that
99 F. Supp. 474 (D.C.N.J. 1951); Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935
(D.D.C. 1950); Evans v. International Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp. 881
(S.D. Ind. 1948).
'See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.03 (1958). See, e.g., Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
' Union membership had grown from under 3.5 million in 1935 to over 14.5
million in 1947. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Directory of National and International Labor
Unions, (1963) cited in S. COHEN. LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 139 (2d ed. 1960).
The Congressional attitude toward unionism in 1947 was reflected in H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1947), and in comments by Congressmen on the floor of
Congress. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 1069-70 (1947) (remarks of Congressman Case);
93 CoNr. REc. A 1295 et. seq. (1947) (remarks of Congressman Landis).
"29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1964).
' 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1964).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101(10) (1), 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(1) (1964).

" Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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difference is best explained by comparison of the conduct each section
was designed to prevent. Violations of the secondary boycott provision at which the 10(l) injunction is aimed, are more likely to cause
unjustified harm than are violations of other provisions of sections
8(a) and 8(b). The discretion vested in the Board under section 10(j)
resembles that of a public prosecutor. 5 Although a prosecutor may
not normally be compelled to bring an action, that he does is no reason
to presume the guilt of the charged party.
The legislative history of the statute reveals nothing which rebuts
the conclusion that increased powers were to be vested in the federal
judiciary. That Congress was displeased with the present means of
administration of the labor law is attested to by references in the
committee reports to "onesidedness" of the present state of the law,"0
and to the "discredited" National Labor Board." The House report
on the original House bill refers to increased powers of review over
administrative action given to federal courts."8 At one point, the
Senate report indicates that one reason for the difference between sections 10(l) and 10(j) is that for some 10(j) unfair labor practices
injunction is not a necessary remedy.39 There is no clear indication
anywhere in the legislative history that this difference was designed to
require courts to defer to the judgment of the new NLRB.40
In the original Senate bill, the word "exclusive" appeared before
"jurisdiction" in the clause granting power to the courts. 41 In the
final version of the bill, as reported out of conference committee, this
word had been omitted.4 2 Although the presence of this word would
have increased the certainty that courts were not to defer to the Board,
its removal may be as well explained by its seeming needlessness, as
by any attempt to change the meaning of the language. When the bill

I

L. MAYERS, THE AamRIcAN LEGAL SYSTEM 44-45 (rev. ed. 1964). In at least
some states, removal for cause is possible. Id. at 45. Compare the unreviewable
discretion of the Board over issuance of complaints. Balanyi v. Local 1031, IBEW,
374 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1967). It may be well argued that even the reasoned decision
not to prosecute ought to be reviewabIe.
= S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
'H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947).
Id.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947).
0
' A helpful collection of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act may be
found in NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Act OF 1947 (1948).
"S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Prior to the change which took place in
conference, the bill read: "[T]he court... shall have exclusive jurisdiction to grant
to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper."
(Emphasis added).
'See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (as reproduced therein), and
final version of the Act.
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was reported in final form out of conference committee, Senator Taft
stated on the floor of Congress that "the provisions regarding injunctions are exactly those which were in the Senate bill... ."" While he
may have been politicking, it seems more likely that he did not consider the change significant.
IV.

FAIRNESS DICTATES THAT THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION

BE CHANGED

In the absence of clear legislative intent, reasonable intent should
be assumed.14 Strong policy grounds suggest that the most reasonable
position in the principal case is in opposition to that taken by the district court.
If courts defer to administrative judgment, power to determine
when injunctions will issue is vested in the Board which is beyond that
required for effective performance of its role as public prosecutor.
To that extent, it is important to consider what procedures are used
by the Board in determining when to seek injunctions. If those procedures do not include proper safeguards against arbitrary action,
private parties may be denied rights guaranteed by due process" and
the Administrative Procedure Act46 and forced unjustifiably to submit to methods at odds with the aims of good government.
Under the procedures used in the 10(j) situation, when a decision
to petition for an injunction is made, the Regional Director does not
hold a hearing or provide an opportunity to rebut the necessity of the
relief.4 7 Discovery of internal memoranda relating to that decision is
not permitted. 48 As a result, the evidence, documentary and testimonial,
is not available for examination.49 In consequence, the reasonableness of
the decision cannot be questioned. Because there are no published
93 CONG. RIEc. 6603 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).

"2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Infra note 47 and text accompanying.

326, § 4508 (3d ed. 1943).

'

'15 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
"As of January 1, 1966, there were no procedures for hearing on 10(j) cases
reported in 29 C.F.R. §§ 101, 102. The Administrative Procedure Act, § 5, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1004 (1964), requires a hearing in cases of adjudication. Due process of law under
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution also requires some form of
notice and hearing. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (construing statutory
provision within the Constitution). See also Opp. Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adminisstrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941).
""United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). The Administrative Procedure
Act § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1964), would seem to require at least some opportunity
for the charged party to hear the evidence against him. Such procedures would also
seem to violate due process. See note 47, supra.
257 F. Supp. at 702. The Administrative Procedure Act §7(c), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1006(c) (1964), would seem to condemn such procedures.
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opinions, the standards which are derived are not available to the
public for use in predicting future action. The absence of a written
opinion makes it impossible to show that a decision is unreasonable or
arbitrary."0 If the members of the Board should publicize informally
the standards they use,5 ' the courts will not bind them to those standards. 2 Because the same body decides whether to prosecute as has an
important part in deciding whether the injunction will issue, the separation of functions guaranteed in the Administrative Procedure Act
is violated.5" Finally, assuming that this is an area in which rulemaking is appropriate, the NLRB has shown great reluctance to use its
rulemaking power,54 and there are no current indications of a change in
attitude." Even if the Board did decide to begin using its rulemaking
power, courts would have to exercise independent judgment as to
whether the Board's standards were followed in the individual case.
Otherwise, those standards would be as meaningless as the public
statements held inapplicable in the principal case.
The principal case is an excellent example of how the absence of
procedural safeguards can affect a private litigant. G.E. sought to bind
the Board to certain public statements of Board members that 10(j)
injunctions would be limited to cases of "flagrant" violations.5 Because there was no hearing, and no written opinion, the company
sought to discover internal memoranda of the Board to show that its
decision to petition was not unanimous.57 That information would
have tended to prove that G.E.'s behavior could not have been considered "flagrant." The district court denied the request for discovery,"' and said that at any rate, the evidence would not have been
'See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES-TExT-PROBLE MS 82-84 (1965). The
Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b) (1964), requires written
findings and conclusions and bases for conclusions in cases of adjudication and
hearing.
" In this particular situation, the Board has made its standards public. See press
releases by Board chairman Frank W. McCulloch in 49 L.R.R. 103 (Nov. 1961),
48 L.R.R. 657 (Sept. 1961). Address by Frank W. McCulloch before a Joint Industrial
Relations Conference at Michigan State University, 49 L.R.R.M. 74, 81-84 (April
1962). See also Statement by General Counsel of N.L.R.B., reproduced infra note 63.
1257 F. Supp. at 702, 708, and n.14.
'§ 5 (c), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1964). It seems unlikely that Congress would have
intended to so drastically alter the procedures it so carefully assured only a year
before. But cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
" Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Power of the NLRB, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
'29 C.F.R. §§ 101, 102 revised as of Jan. 1, 1966, included no new substantive
rules of the Board.
257 F. Supp. at 708. It is likely that counsel for respondant were misled by the
public statements made by McCulloch in late 1961 and early 1962. See note 51 supra.
'257 F. Supp. at 702. Apparently the decision to prosecute in the principal case
was made by the Board itself.
' The court relied on United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
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helpful because the Board cannot be bound by public statements of its
members." Whatever the merits of G.E.'s claim, the procedures to
which it was subjected are disturbing.
It may be convincingly argued that the question of harm from unfair labor practices for which injunction is an appropriate remedy is
one requiring special expertise which the Board is best able to provide."0 If that is the case, then the statute ought to be changed to provide acceptable procedural safeguards. Only a refusal by the courts to
defer to administrative judgment, or an amendment of the statute itself, will ever make clarification of standards for issuance possible.
Such clarification is necessary because the current situation is detrimental to the just and orderly administration of the law. Owing to
the extraordinary and oppressive nature of injunctive relief, assurance
is needed that it will not be used unless absolutely necessary.61 On the
other hand, the importance of the goals of the labor law dictate that it
be certain that injunctions will issue when they are needed.12 Clear
standards provide the trial courts with a means to know what facts
are relevant, so those facts can be ascertained. They allow all courts
to know what law is relevant so as to avoid the appearance of arbitrariness. Finally, they allow for the rational guidance of parties by
counsel at the level of primary private activity.
A good start toward meaningful standards was set out in a public
statement by General Counsel of the NLRB in 1961.3 These standards are clear and they comport with the policy suggested by the
context and legislative history of section 10 (j).
c 257 F. Supp. at 702, 708, and n.14. See also NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.,
312 U.S. 426, 439 (1941) (Douglas J. dissenting).
'Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).

"IIt may be that in the individual case complete justice cannot be certain either
with or without an injunction. In the principal case, the injunction compelled G.E.
to submit to bargaining which might later have been found unfair. If no injunction
had issued, the union would have been compelled to submit to demands by G.E.
which might also have later been found unfair. Where such a situation exists the
balance ought to be struck in favor of denying relief because of the nature of the

remedy. See W.

DEFumIAK, MODERN EQUITY

16, § 8 (1956).

It may be argued that temporary injunctions are a needed supplement to the
limited powers of the board to compel compliance with its orders. The suggestions
of this note would not significantly restrict use of injunctions as a remedy. They
would rather assure that the use made of the remedy was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
' Statement of General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board reported
in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Labor Relations Board of the
Comnittee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,

pt. 2 (June 29, 1961):
No rigid criteria for the authorization of Section 10(j) action has been adopted
by the Board; rather, each case has been considered on its individual merits.
An analysis of past cases, however, indicates that consideration has been given to
such factors as: (1) the clarity of the alleged violation; (2) whether the case
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Even if the courts apply a discriminating set of standards in 10(j)
injunction cases, there is no assurance that the Board will seek those
injunctions. 64 Though more have been granted than have been denied,
it is difficult to argue on such evidence alone that too many have issued
because compared with the total number of eligible violations so few
have been sought. The infrequency of use of section 10(j) is no reason to sanction the existence of arbitrary power whether or not it is
exercised, nor is it an adequate excuse for the lack of predictability
which plagues this section of the Act. Although the Board is held only
to a loose standard of prosecutorial discretion in whether to take any
action, that standard excludes the unreasonable and the arbitrary.0 5
It is the office of a legal system to make it ostensibly, as well as factually certain that governmental power is properly exercised.

PHYSICAL INJURY AND THE MISREPRESENTATION
EXCEPTION OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, § 2680(h)
Plaintiff, operating a dragline' while improving the channel of a
small creek, struck and detonated a natural gas pipeline which was
shown on Government site plans 2 to be located outside the work area.
involves the shutdown of important business operations which, because of their
special nature, would have an extraordinary impact on the public interest; (3)
whether the alleged unfair labor practices involve an unusually wide geogrphic
area, thus creating special problems of public concern; (4) whether the unfair
labor practices create special remedy problems so that it would probably be
impossible either to restore the status quo or effectively to dissipate the consequences of the unfair labor practices through resort solely to the regular procedures
provided in the Act for Board order and subsequent enforcement proceedings;
(5) whether the unfair labor practices involve interference with the conduct of
an election or constitute a flagrant disregard of a Board certification of a bargaining representative or other Board procedures; (6) whether the continuation of the
alleged unfair labor practice will result in exceptional hardship to the charging
party; (7) whether the current unfair labor practice is of a continuing or
repetitious pattern; (8) whether, if violence is involved, the violence is of such
a nature as to be out of control of local authorities or otherwise widespread and
susceptible of control by 10(j) relief.
There is no reason why standards used in 10(l) cases to date could not be applied
to the 10(j) situation if the relationship is kept clear.
" See, e.g., Bandlow v. Rothman, 278 F.2d 866 (D.D.C. 1960) ; Hourihan v. NLRB,
201 F.2d 187 (D.D.C.), cert. denied 345 U.S. 930 (1953).
'Office Employee's International Union v. Labor Board, 353 U.S. 313 (1957);
Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952).
"'An excavating machine in which the bucket is attached only by cables and is
NEW
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drawn toward the machine during the filling operation ...
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(1961).

2 Plans were furnished by the United States Department of Agriculture,
Soil Con.
servation Service.

